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This article undertakes a rule of law critique of privatization as economic
reform policy in Nigeria. The rule of law approach interrogates not just the
policy rationales of the programme but also its methodology. The article
distinguishes between a formal and substantive justice conception of rule of
law and argues that the substantive justice conception of rule of law and its
policy imperatives, sourced from the Fundamental Objectives and Directive
Principles of State Policy in Chapter 2 of the 1999 Constitution, provides a
veritable framework to realize the strategic goals of privatization in Nigeria.
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1.  INTRODUCTION
Privatization, as a governance framework, involves the transfer of
ownership of stocks and assets from a nation to individual citizens or
corporate entities.1 Since the 1970s, privatization has been promoted
across the world as a tool for dealing with public sector inefficiency
and budget deficits.2 The real impetus for privatization, especially for
many of the developing countries, arose from the global financial crisis
that attended the Israeli-Arab war in 1973. This slowed down oil supply
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1 Paul Starr, “The Meaning of Privatization” (1988) 6 Yale Law and Policy Review
6-41. Savas defines privatization as “the act of reducing the role of government,
or increasing the role of the private sector, in an activity or in the ownership of
assets.” Also, Emanuel Savas, Privatization: The Key to Better Government
(Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, 1987) 3.
2 Savas, ibid.
2 AFE BABALOLA UNIVERSITY:  J. OF SUST. DEV. LAW & POLICY VOL. 10: 1: 2019
3 David M. Newbery, Privatization, Restructuring, and Regulation of Network
Utilities (The MIT Press, 1999), pp. 1-25.
4 Ibid 19.
5 See for more details of the policy, Federal Republic of Nigeria, National Electric
Power Policy (NEPP), 2000.
6 https://www.vanguardngr.com/2019/04/economy-bleeds-as-power-
generation-drops-to-2039mw/
7 Editorial, Punch Newspaper, 1 November 2018 <https://punchng.com/power-
privatisation-disco-owners-must-let-go/> accessed 8 December 2018.
and resulted in a balance of payment crisis for some commodity
economies like Nigeria. But the dynamics for a global resort to
privatization came from the United Kingdom under the regime of
Margaret Thatcher whose Tory government decided to deal with UK
economic crisis by the political ideology of reducing the role of
government through the economic policy of privatization. It started
with the steel industry and got to electricity. Between 1979 and 1992,
the Thatcher administration had privatized 39 UK companies, making
it one of the largest privatization exercises. Before then, privatization
already started in Chile but it did not have a global impact like that of
the UK. In Chile, the government unbundled vertically integrated
utilities and sold them to private firms. In the United States, the
government took to liberalization and restructuring.3 But, invariably,
the UK example of privatization proved compelling across the world
because of its capacity to raise £16.6 billion.4 Nigeria followed the UK
example in 2001 with its National Electric Power Policy (NEPP).5
However, after many years of privatization attempts in Nigeria,
especially in the electricity sector, the results so far have been very
disappointing. Ranging from corruption, lack of transparency, poor
quality of service, lack of capacity and injudicious tariff increases, the
sector has been assailed with crises which suggest that privatization
has not justified its billing. For example, In November 2013 when
power assets were handed over to successful private sector bidders,
the average quantity of electricity supplied from the grid was about
3,400MW. About six years later, on the day that the Minister of Power
presented his three-year scorecard, electricity generation had fallen to
2,039MW.6
The many failures and challenges have led to critiques of both the
theory and practice of privatization.7 Policymakers are also rethinking
whether privatization is a wise policy in the present context of economic
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8 Nigerian Govt. to review power sector privatization, Premium Times, 12 October
2018. <https://punchng.com/power-privatisation-disco-owners-must-let-go>
accessed on 8 December 2018.
9 All economic reform policies since the Structural Adjustment Programme in the
1980s have focused on privatization as a strategic intervention to boost
productivity. Although the current Economic Recovery and Growth Plan (ERGP)
did not specifically mention privatization as a strategy to achieve economic
growth and diversification, it focuses on private sector leadership in providing
critical infrastructure. See Ministry of Budget & National Planning, Economic
Recovery & Growth Plan 2017-2020 (Abuja 2017), p.13.
10 I will explain hereafter the conception of rule of law this paper relies on. But for
a general discussion of rule of law and privatization in Nigeria, see use Chapter
4 of Sam Amadi, Privatization and Public Good: the Rule of Law Challenge (CPPR
2008) for a fuller discussion of different perspectives of the concept of the rule
of law.
11 There has been little focus on the methodology of privatization in public literature
of privatization. The assumption seems to be the privatization is a zero-sum
game: we either do it or we don’t. but it does matter a lot how we do it.
development in Nigeria.8 The debate about privatization throws up
the challenge of determining whether it is the economic theory or policy
assumption or even the execution strategy of privatization that is the
problem. Legal theorists should not be left out of this debate as the
legal framework of privatization is as important as its economic theory
propositions.
As Nigeria looks towards private sector finances to achieve its
strategic growth policies, privatization as a solution to the challenges
of economic development in Nigeria will remain a contentious issue.9
From a rule of law perspective, the debate on privatization should not
end at whether public enterprises should be privatized or not.10 A rule
of law perspective on privatization is not exhausted by a debate
whether a country like Nigeria facing economic distress should resort
to divesting its public stock to private firms or continue to look for
solutions within the framework of public ownership and control of
enterprises. That is obviously an important debate; and it has been
the favoured form of critique of privatization, especially by the
organized labour in Nigeria. As important, and even, preeminent, as
this sort of critique might be, a rule of law critique of privatization
should extend to a critique of both the methodology and mechanism
adopted for the privatization of state-owned enterprise and the political
and economic impacts of such divestment.11
This article is divided into five sections. After this introduction,
section 2 discusses the meaning of a rule of law approach to
4 AFE BABALOLA UNIVERSITY:  J. OF SUST. DEV. LAW & POLICY VOL. 10: 1: 2019
12 Judith N. Shklar, Legalism: Law, Morals, and Political Trials (Harvard University
Press, 1986), p. 1.
13 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, Harvard University Press,
1978).
privatization and where it matters for privatization. It argues that it
matters because of the imperatives of equality and fairness. It matters
also because failed privatization will undermine the prospect of
economic and social welfare, which is an objective of a rule of law
approach to economic management. section 3 examines the legal
framework of privatization scheme in Nigeria, including the Constitution
that articulates the fundamental objectives of state policy and the laws
that control privatization transactions in Nigeria. The section concludes
that the failure of the privatization laws to incorporate constitutional
values of fairness and equality undermines the prospect of achieving
its strategic objectives. Section 4 explores the fundamental values that
should guide valuable and effective privatization in the form of an in-
depth analysis of section 16 of Chapter 2 of the Constitution. Section
5 of this article considers how the failure of the rule of law has affected
privatization in Nigeria. Adopting the substantive justice conception
of the rule of law, it argues that the privatization process did not comply
with the four imperatives implicit in Chapter 2 of the Constitution.
Section 6 is the conclusion.
2.  WHY DOES A RULE OF LAW CRITIQUE MATTER
FOR PRIVATIZATION?
The rule of law critique is based on a rule of law approach to
understanding social phenomena. A rule of law approach is different
from a legalistic approach. According to Judith Shklar, “Legalism is the
ethical attitude that holds moral conduct to be a matter of rule-
following, and moral relationships to consist of duties and rights
determined by rules”.12 Contrarily, a rule of law approach relates social
activities to the ideals and morality embedded in the law. It is not just
about “rule following” nut more about alignment with the principles
and purposes of the law. As Ronald Dworkin would argue, a rule of
approach approximates the manner in which judges consider legal
problems. For them, the law doesn’t just consist of rules, but also
principles and moral ideals.13 So, a rule of law approach to privatization
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14 See Sam Amadi, “Rule of Law Approach to Regulating Electricity Supply in
Nigeria” (2017) 8 (2) Afe Babalola University Journal of Sustainable Development
Law and Policy, pp. 26-32.
15 Fairness in matters of distribution has been a matter of grave concern to legal
theory and political philosophy. Utilitarianism, libertarianism and justice as
fairness as political philosophies and legal theories have differed on what is fair
and just in relation to income and wealth. For libertarians like Robert Nozick, all
forms of distribution of wealth apart from the use of free market is violative of
human freedom. See Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York 1974).
16 Political philosophers have had divergent reactions to the fact of inequality.
Aristotle and Thomas Hobbes did not consider general equality an important
ethical value; hence their theories did not presume on the primacy of equality
in constructing a just society. See Aristotle, Politics, Book 3 page 78. But modern
liberal philosophers like John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin place more emphasis
on equality.
17 Inequality has remained a major concern of liberal theory. Right from Thomas
Hobbes to John Rawls, liberal political theory has grappled with how to justify
inequality in the context of a just and democratic society. Hobbes thinks that as
long as no human being is so powerful that he or she cannot be defeated by the
combination of power and guile of other humans, then there is desirable equality
(see Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. XIII). John Rawls accepts inequality only if
it pertains to offices open to all citizens and if it is to the greatest advantage of
advocates compliances with such principles as equality, fairness and
social wellbeing.14
There are at least two main reasons why the rule of law (particularly,
human rights and social justice) advocates should bother about how a
nation privatizes its public enterprises and social services. As earlier
noted, privatization involves the transfer of ownership of stocks and
assets from the nation to individual citizens or corporate entities. Such
transfer may result in unfair enrichment of a few citizens and the
deprivation of many others.15 It may also result in the creation of a
private monopoly that may further reduce access and enjoyment of
essential social services by the poor. Some may argue that there is
little wrong with the disparity of wealth amongst citizens as long as
such wealth is not gotten by theft and fraud, although democracy is
best sustained where there is general equality amongst citizens. As
long as such disparity of wealth is a result of disparity of efforts or
unequal application of brain and brawn by citizens, the democratic
theory may tolerate it.16 But where such inequality is a result of
allocating public resources to some citizens and not the others, that is,
where inequality results in the exclusion of some from access to basic
social and economic opportunities, then, such inequality is both
iniquitous and intolerable.17
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the least advantaged members of the community (See Rawls, Political Liberalism
(Columbia University Press 1996).
18 Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality
(Cambridge Mass. 2000).
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid., p. 1.
Ronald Dworkin has tackled the problem of equality in an
authoritative book.18 In his view, equality matters because it is at the
heart of political morality and social justice for “no government is
legitimate that does not show concern for all those citizens over whom
it claims dominion and from whom it claims allegiance”. Asking what
needs to be equalized, he answered by rating the “equality of resources”
above the “equality of welfare”.19 But, the key point for this discussion
is the recognition of the role of law and legal interventions in private
and public markets in engendering equality and inequality. As Dworkin
puts it, the distribution of wealth “is the product of a legal order: a
citizen’s wealth massively depends on which law his community has
enacted – not only in laws governing ownership, theft, contract, tort,
but its welfare law; tax law, labo[u]r law, civil rights law, environmental
regulation law, and laws of practically everything else”.20 In other words,
inequality is not a natural result. It is socially constructed through
legal intervention in socially autonomous and non-autonomous
interactions. Therefore, where government intervention in an existing
market results in inequality of income, then that intervention requires
some justification as a legitimate act of government. For this reason,
at least, legal theorists and social justice activists should care about
the rule of law implications of privatization.
The second reason why rule of law and social justice theorists
should care about privatization concerns the economic argument for
privatization. Privatization ought to result in more productivity and
greater efficiency in the use of scarce human and physical capital. If by
virtue of the faulty mechanism of privatization, efficiency or productivity
is endangered, the material welfare of citizens is underserved. Since
rule of law includes the promotion of social and welfare development
of people on the one hand, and the Nigerian Constitution commits the
state to securing the welfare of Nigeria on the other, a privatization
process that fails to engender efficiency and productivity does not
promote the rule of law. So, it is in the interest of the promotion of
human rights and the protection of the rule of law that we continue to
2019 DOING IT RIGHT:  A RULE OF LAW CRITIQUE OF PRIVATIZATION METHODOLOGY 7
21 See Chapter 1 of Bernardo Bortolotti and Domenico Siniscalco, The Challenge of
Privatization: An International Analysis (Oxford University Press 2004) for a
discussion of the economic theory underlining privatization.
22 Sam Amadi, Privatization & Public Good: The Rule of Law Challenge (CPPR
2009), p. 35-45.
23 National Planning Commission, Meeting Everyone’s Needs: National Empowerment
and Economic Development Strategy (NEEDS) (Abuja: National Planning
Commission, 2004).
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inquire about the methods and approaches that the privatization agency
adopts to deal with inefficient public enterprises and institutions. The
logic of privatization is partly that the monopoly status of public
enterprises more or less disposes them to inefficiency in utilization of
resources which invariably results in welfare loss for citizens as
consumers.21 Therefore, allowing monopolistic structures around private
ownership may lead to a similar welfare loss.
Since the late 1980s, and arising partly because of the Structural
Adjustment Programme (SAP) introduced to address the balance of
trade deficits of Nigeria and other Sub-Saharan African countries,
privatization has featured prominently as a policy to reform the
economy.22 The National Economic and Empowerment Development
Strategy (NEEDS) arguably has been the boldest and most
comprehensive of Nigeria’s economic reform plan since 2000.23 NEEDS
states that “the government will . . . privatize, deregulate and liberalize
publicly owned industries to promote competition, expand industries,
generate employment, create wealth, and receive value for money”.
But, NEEDS does not provide any guidance on how to privatize public
enterprises. It seems to argue that privatization howsoever conducted
would be beneficial to the Nigerian economy. But, as Nobel Laureate
Joseph Stiglitz famously puts it, privatization, even if it is a good policy,
can be wrongly executed. And when it is executed in a wrong manner,
the consequence is not just that the efficiency gain is lost, but a lot
more harm can be done to citizens, especially the poor.24 The most
important and enduring problem of privatization in Nigeria may not
be the rationale for its introduction. It would rather be the ill-conceived
and poorly executed processes and mechanisms that have resulted in
faulty privatization. This article considers the rule of law framework of
a welfare-enhancing privatization in Nigeria and what fundamental
criteria needs to be met before such privatization could be rule-of-law
compliant.
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25 The military government usually suspended the Constitution whenever it took
over power from civilian government. It achieved this by enacting a Constitution
modification and suspension decrees. These decrees suspend the legislative
branch of government and modify the provisions relating to the jurisdiction of
the court and enforcement of fundamental rights of citizens. See the Constitution
(Suspension and Modification) Decree No.1 of 1984 (particularly, sections1-5)
and The Federal Military Government (Supremacy of Powers) Decree No. 13 of
1984. The Supreme Court approved these restrictions in F.S. Uwaifo v. Attorney
General of Bendel State (1982) SC. The Supreme Court nailed it per Karibi-
Whyte, JSC in Military Government of Ondo v. Adewunmi (1988) 3 NWLR (Pt.
82) 208 at 305 that “The Constitution, in so far as it survived and it applied,
did and still does so on the benevolence, sufferance and behest of the authority
of the Military Government”. See generally Ben O. Nwabueze, Military Rule and
Constitutionalism (Spectrum Books, 1992), pp. 20-21.
26 Section 5(1)(a) of the CFRN, 1999 provides that “…the executive powers of
the Federation shall be vested in the President and may, subject as aforesaid
and to the provisions off any law made by the National Assembly, be exercised
by him either directly or through the Vice President or Ministers of Government
of the Federation or other officers of the public service of the Federation...”. This
is the foundation of the President’s power to manage the national economy.
3.  ANALYSIS OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORKS FOR
PRIVATIZATION IN NIGERIA
Privatization has been conducted under a plethora of laws that often
seem inconsistent or incoherent when compared with the Constitution.
Most of these sector laws regulating privatization exercises in Nigeria
were enacted under military rule. Under the military, some of the
provisions of the Constitution are either suspended or amended or the
entire extent of constitutionalism severely limited,25 therefore, these
privatization laws may not embody some of the rule of law values
embedded in the Constitution. There are two basic laws governing the
privatization of public enterprises in Nigeria: the Constitution and the
privatization laws, particularly the Public Enterprises (Privatization
and Commercialization) Act 1999.
3.1 Constitutional Framework
The 1999 Constitution provides the basic rule of law framework for
any economic or commercial activity in Nigeria. It empowers the
President, by himself or through the ministers or other assistants, to
manage the national economy for the good of the Federal Republic of
Nigeria.26 The Constitution grants the National Assembly the power of
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27 See sections 80-88 of the CFRN 1999.
28 See Chapter 4 of the CFRN, 1999 guaranteeing classical form of civil and
political rights.
29 See Chapter 2 of the CFRN 1999 guaranteeing social, economic and cultural
rights.
30 Ibid.
co-managing the economy through legislation and policy oversight.27
The Constitution also provides a full complement of “fundamental
human rights” which every public official and institution should observe,
at the risk of judicial sanctions.28 These rights, which can be adjudicated
in a court and remedies granted by courts are coupled with other “social
and economic rights” which are deemed unenforceable by the courts.
The second category of “rights” is described as the “Fundamental
Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy”.29 These directive
principles arguably provide the economic, social and cultural objectives
for the management of natural and physical resources and assets in
Nigeria. They also provide for both the strategic and normative directions
of economic development and the social and political welfare of
Nigerian citizens.
It is pertinent to analyse some of the provisions of the “Fundamental
Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy” in order to illustrate
the strategic and normative definitions of statecraft in Nigeria and
provide a good framework for a rule of law critique of the privatization
methodology. The relevant provisions are in section 16 of the
Constitution, which defines the economic objectives of the Nigerian
government as follows:
The State shall, within the context of the ideals and objectives for
which provisions are made in this Constitution – (a) harness the
resources of the nation and promote national prosperity and an
efficient, a dynamic and self-reliant economy (sic); (b) control
the national economy in such a manner as to secure the maximum
welfare, freedom and happiness of every citizen on the basis of
social justice and equality of status and opportunity; (c) without
prejudice to its right to operate or participate in areas of the
economy, other than the major sectors of the economy, manage
and operate the major sectors of the economy.30
First, the Constitution commits the government to ensuring a
prosperous and efficient economy that is dynamic and self-reliant. It
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31 See John Rawls. A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA Harvard University Press,
1971); John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University, 1993), especially
Lecture VII.
32 “Prioritarianism maintains that a greater weight should be placed on improving
the well-being of those who are worse off than on improving the well-being of
those who are better off. Prioritarians, like egalitarians, will in practice endorse
policies that reduce inequality”. See Daniel Hausman, Michael McPherson and
Debra Satz, Economic Analysis, Moral Philosophy and Public Policy (Cambridge
2017), p. 202.
assumes that “prosperity” “efficiency” and “self-reliance” are comple-
mentary virtues and their actualization are self-reinforcing. That is, an
efficient economy will be prosperous as well as self-reliant. So, at the
minimum, the management of the national economy must have as its
declared objective a clear commitment to wealth creation and
maximizing collective wealth. This can be called “the growth imperative”
of the national economy. The second aspect of section 16 relates to a
commitment to ensure that the management of the national economy
leads to social justice and equity. The Constitution proclaims the
equality of status and opportunity to access the basic structure of justice
– what in the language of modern liberalism is called “basic social
goods” or “basic structure of justice”.31 This second commitment is
called “the social justice imperative” of the national economy. What I
call “the social justice imperative” is based on the concept of equality
or equal regard. The sort of equality envisaged in the directive principle
of state policy is one that provides equal opportunity for all citizens to
“maximize welfare, freedom and happiness”. This is a form of
egalitarianism or prioritarianism.32 We will say more about this when
we discuss further on the fundamental values underwriting these
imperatives.
The two imperatives are further reinforced by another imperative:
“the state regulatory imperative”, which requires that no matter the
mode of production adopted for the management of the major sectors
of the economy, the state must continue to exercise its regulatory
powers to ensure protection of all the citizen to engage in meaningful
economic activities. This imperative comes out clearly in section 16
(1) (d). It also empowers Nigerians to engage in other sectors of the
economy outside the major sector the economy. Therefore, it mandates
free enterprises in addition to the maintenance of public enterprises.
So, no law should deprive Nigerians of the right to engage in profit-
making enterprises.
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33 As part of the politics of the Structural Adjustment Programme, the Babangida
administration orchestrated a public debate on the acceptability of the
International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) loan and its conditions. Although the
Nigerian people overwhelmingly rejected the loan, the administration
nevertheless implemented the condition, which included the withdrawal of
government from the “commanding heights of the economy”.
34 See John Williamson, “What Washington Means by Policy Reform” in John
Williamson, ed., Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened?
Subsection 2 of section 16 further mandates the government to
manage the economy in a manner that ensures a “balanced and planned”
economy in which its material benefits are shared in a manner that
promotes “the common good”, and ownership and control of the means
of production and distribution is not concentrated in the hands of a
few. This implies a fourth imperative: “the imperative of equality”.
Subsection 3 goes further to prescribe that the legislature will establish
an agency to monitor and review the ownership structure of the
Nigerian economy and would recommend to the President an industrial
structure as well as implement any law on enterprise ownership and
control. We can describe this as “the imperative of a planned economy”.
Subsection 4 defines “major sector of the economy” to mean a sector
so declared by the National Assembly and guarantees that unless a
contrary resolution is issued by the National Assembly, any sector
exclusively managed by the government either directly or through a
corporation or agency, shall not be open to private participation. This
is “the imperative of public enterprise”. I will discuss these imperatives
in the context of the normative landscape of the privatization exercise
in Nigeria when we analyse the value orientation of the programme.
In the meantime, it is pertinent to analyse the transactional laws
guiding the privatization programme to see how they align with the
constitutional provisions.
3.2 Legal Framework
The initial framework for privatization in Nigeria was established during
the military administration of General Ibrahim Babangida. The military
government of Ibrahim Babangida introduced the privatization
programme in Nigeria as a conditionality for the IMF economic reform
programme during the global financial crisis of the late 1980s.33 This
set of fiscal policy responses (the harbinger of the Washington
Consensus) is generally called the Structural Adjustment Programme.34
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(Washington DC, Institute of International Economy 1990) for a discussion of
the series of policy choices referred to as the “Washington Consensus”.
35 Privatisation and Commercialisation Act No. 25 of 1988.
36 Ibid.
37 Bureau for Public Enterprises Decree No. 28 of 1993.
38 Public Enterprises (Privatization and Commercialization) Act, 1999 Cap 38
Laws of the Federation of Nigeria.
39 Section 8 of Public Enterprises (Privatization and Commercilization) Act 1999.
40 Other members of the Council include the relevant Ministers of Finance, Justice,
Industry, and the Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria.
41 Section 11, ibid.
The first set of privatization was executed under the Privatization
and Commercialization Act of 1988.35 In 1993, the government
established the Technical Committee for Privatization and Commercia-
lization (TCPC) pursuant to powers under the 1988 Act.36 The TCPC
recommended the speeding up of the privatization programme. Later,
another law, the Bureau for Public Enterprises law created the Bureau
for Public Enterprises (BPE) to replace the TCPC, take over the process
and continue the privatization programme.37 In 1999, the Federal
Government repealed the BPE Act and enacted the Public Enterprises
(Privatization and Commercialization) Act 1999..38 The new Act created
the National Council on Privatization as the policymaking authority
on privatization and the Bureau for Public Enterprises (BPE) as the
transaction manager of privatization.39 The Vice-President is the
chairman of the Council.40 The 1999 Act attempts to streamline the
bureaucracy of privatization in Nigeria in such a way that “steering” is
sequestered from “rowing”. Whereas the National Council on
Privatization (NCP) determines broad privatization policies (steering),
the Bureau for Public Enterprises (BPE) executes the technical tasks of
privatizing designated public enterprises (rowing). The Council is vested
with far-reaching powers and has the BPE as its secretariat.
The applicable law for privatization in Nigeria today is the Public
Enterprises (Privatization and Commercialization) Act 1999. The other
laws have been repealed. This law does not provide the strategic
objectives and guiding principles for privatization. It only provides
that the National Council on Privatization has the authority to determine
“the political, economic and social objectives of privatization and
commercialization in Nigeria”.41 The Act also provides for two basic
modes of divestment of government shares in public enterprises to be
privatized. this could be by public issue or private placement.
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Nevertheless, the act gave the NCP power to determine the mode to
be adopted for any specific privatization, including by willing buyer or
willing seller mode.42
It is remarkable that the privatization process in Nigeria started
with clear national legislation. Privatization does not require a
comprehensive legislation as such. But the reason for this demanding
legislation might be because the constitutional and legal designation
of some enterprises in Nigeria as public enterprises necessitated the
need for a comprehensive national privatization law. Not doing so
would have enabled a disaffected person or even the leadership of
organized labour to seek judicial invalidation of the entire privatization
programme. Again, a comprehensive legislation could notionally
engender transparency and accountability, and therefore, militate against
populist opposition to the process that may result in a policy reversal.
But beyond the formal notion of transparency and accountability that
a national legislation may provide, the question that should interest
critical observers is whether the structures and agencies established
under the law are able to promote accountability and efficiency in
reality. Furthermore, it is important to ask whether the privatization
programme itself is being executed according to the provisions of the
law?
The first comprehensive economic reform programme after the
enactment of the 1999 Constitution was the National Economic
Empowerment and Development Strategy. The NEEDS document did
not create a new privatization law; instead, it acknowledged the existing
one. NEEDS renewed privatization initiatives were constructed under
the legal regime established by the Public Enterprises (Privatization
and Commercialization) Act. Under this regime, the National Council
on Privatization has responsibility for formulating broad policies on
privatization for the Bureau for Public Enterprises to execute. The
Council is made up of government officials, including the Attorney-
General of the Federation, the Minister of Finance, and the Governor
of the Central Bank. The Chairman of the Council is the Vice-President.
The relationship between the NCP, the BPE and the ministries with
managerial responsibility for the enterprises slated for privatization is
neither clear nor coherent in the law. This incoherence affects the quality
of privatization deals. Such was evident in the controversy over the
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privatization of the nation’s only airline, the Nigerian Airways. The
Minister of Aviation and the Director-General of the BPE disagreed on
the suitability of the core investor – Airwing of UK – to turn-around
the aviation industry.
The NCP was invested with power to, among other things,
determine the political, economic and social objectives of privatization;
designate the public enterprises to be fully or partially privatized or
commercialized; approve the legal and regulatory framework for the
privatization; and review periodically the impacts and effects of
privatization. BPE had the mandate to implement NCP’s policies on
privatization and commercialization; prepare enterprises for
privatization and commercialization and advise the NCP on which
enterprises to privatize and the methods to adopt. The law also
designated enterprises to be fully or partially privatized or
commercialized. Enterprises to be partially privatized included the
Nigerian Telecommunications Ltd (later Plc); National Electric Power
Authority; Daily Times of Nigeria; New Nigeria Newspapers; NICON
Insurance Company; Nigerian Airways Ltd; and so on. Enterprises to
be fully privatized included FESTAC 77 Hotel; African Petroleum;
Unipetrol; ANAMCO; VON; West Africa Cement Co, and so on.
Enterprises to be partially commercialized included Nigeria Railways
Corporation; Nigeria Television Authority; Federal Radio Corporation
of Nigeria; etc, while Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation; Nigeria
Ports Authority; Federal Housing Authority; etc, were to be fully
commercialized. The law authorized the NCP to re-designate an
enterprise from one category to another as it deemed fit. Critics have
interpreted this provision as contravening the Constitution that grants
the National Assembly the exclusive power to amend legislation. To
grant an agency or executive body power to re-designate enterprises
that the parliament had previously designated for a particular purpose
is to grant such agency or body the power to make laws.43 But, clearly,
the National Assembly has delegated the power to relist enterprises to
the NCP.
43 Kalu Onuoha, “The Legal Regulation of Privatization – A Critique” and Emeka
Iheme, “The Legal Regulation of Privatization in Nigeria” in Eze Onyekpere
(ed.) Readings on Privatization (Socio-Economic Rights Initiatives 2003) for
arguments in support of the claim of unconstitutionality of the section 6 (3) Act
28 of 1999 which purports to authorise the NCP to re-designate enterprises
for privatization of commercialization.
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44 Ibid and see also Sam Amadi, Privatization & Public Good (supra), pp. 143-
155.
45 David Trubek, “The Rule of Law in Development Assistance: Past, Present, and
Future” in David Trubek and Alvaro Santos (eds), The New Law and Economic
Development: A Critical Appraisal (Cambridge 2006), p. 87.
The faulty legal regime of privatization and the initial lack of legal
incidences of privatization knowledge on the part of transaction
managers led to many avoidable policy errors which distorted the
process, entrenched inefficiency and engendered public scepticism. The
BPE failed to do a proper legal audit before proceeding with the
privatization of some enterprises. The case of NEPA stands out. For
instance, BPE prepared NEPA for privatization even after the NEPA Act
had described it as a public enterprise and granted it exclusive right to
produce and market electricity in Nigeria. BPE thus proceeded on the
erroneous assumption that it could privatize NEPA without a specific
enabling legislation until the House of Representatives Committee on
Privatization overruled it.44
Privatization advocates argue that it is always better to lock the
privatization process into a duly enacted law, saying it would increase
the cost of revision and reversion. This is because policies change faster
than legislation, and when a process is locked into legislation, interests
built upon it are better protected against the risks of democratic politics.
This is a form of political insurance. Legislation will also assure the
investors that the rules and processes that will determine their fate are
not amenable to executive fiat or administrative neurosis. Investors
prefer great clarity in terms of risks and benefits. They understand that
process is very important; hence they demand clear and prior rules of
engagement that stipulate rate making and other incidences of
profitability and sustainability of their business. This is an aspect of
the formalistic conception of the rule of law which has featured greatly
in the rule of law mantra that institutions such as the World Bank
bandy around as being among the important criteria for economic
development. Such conception was unhelpful, as David Trubek argues,
because it did not “include protection of human rights but . . . included
the right to property as well as civil and political rights. Property was
emphasized. The role of the judiciary was to police the boundaries
between state and market, and it was thought they would do this
through a formalistic mechanism”.45 Even the formalistic conception
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46 Adam Przeworski, “Privatization and its Alternatives” in Adam Przeworski et
al, Sustainable Development (Cambridge 1995), p. 94.
of rule of law as clarity and certainty cannot be achieved by only
enacting one transaction law. There is a need to have other laws dealing
with accounting, bankruptcy and, most importantly, competition.
Failure to have such supplementary legislation means there is
incomplete legalization of privatization procedures, which could lead
to a failed privatization.
Privatization is not a stand-alone in the quest for efficiency and
quality of service post-privatization. This will require the full complement
of institutions that incentivize efficient behaviour and create the
environment for an orderly running of the market. If the inefficiency of
the public enterprise is traced mainly to the principal-agent problem
and the prevalence of “soft budget line”, then successful privatization
would require institutionalization of corporate governance rules that
commit agent to pursue principal’s interests and impose hard budget
lines on the entity. This is achieved through comprehensive and effective
legislation. The assumption that privatizing public enterprises
necessarily cures these corporate pathologies is false, as demonstrated
by Adam Przeworski et al. As they rightly argue, the assumption that
public enterprise is rife with the principal-agent problem and private
enterprises free of it is false. What saves the private or public enterprise
from the principal-agent problem and the perverse incentive of “soft
budget line” is good corporate governance regime and not necessarily
change of ownership.46
If the end of privatization is to improve service delivery to citizens
as consumers, then the exercise ought to proceed with the end in mind.
This means that the design and execution of privatization should be
based on how the enterprise will perform differently, how this
performance will affect the industry and how the industry performance
will affect the general economy. So, it should be a predictable movement
from allocative efficiency to dynamic efficiency. This calls for legislative
and regulatory audit to ensure that every stage of the process complies
with both the enabling law as well as achieve the strategic objectives
of privatization, including the constitutional imperatives. These
strategic objectives should be part of the complementary legislation
that supports privatization and constitutes the new political economy
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47 Many years after beginning privatization, Nigeria is yet to enact a competition
law. A competition bill has failed twice in the National Assembly. The latest one
– Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Commission Bill – is has just
been passed by both houses of the National Assembly and sent to the President
for assent. The author was chairman of the Senate Technical Committee that
reviewed the proposed bill before its passage.
48 Punch Editorial 27 July 2005.
of efficient and competitive operations. This new emergent legal regime
should include competition policy and framework articulated in anti-
trust legislation.47
Successful privatization will also require that at each stage of the
process, the transaction managers conduct due diligence on the legal
status of enterprises to be privatized so as know what sort of ownership
and management structure the law has stipulated for the enterprise
and determine whether it is necessary to re-designate such enterprise
before privatization. This is one aspect of the formalist compliance
with rule of law. In some instances, the transaction managers had
claimed to have privatized such designated enterprises without
changing their legal designation. That was what happened in the
botched privatization of the railways, which the legislature cancelled
because of failure to follow the law.48
The lack of detailed provision on the strategic objectives and
normative framework for conducting privatization in the transaction
law means that a greater than necessary discretion is granted to the
National Council on Privatization to determine the entire methodology
of privatization through the Bureau of Public Enterprises. This legislative
lacuna has disposed privatization manager to betray a lack of
commitment to the four imperatives established in section 16 of the
Constitution. The legal regime for privatization in Nigeria fails to
incorporate the rule of law values which the Constitution has mandated
as part of the directive principle for the management of the national
economy. I argue that this avoidance or neglect has contributed to
making privatization in Nigeria unable to achieve results that conform
to the rule of law. Therefore, the lack of legislative clarity and
comprehensiveness may have resulted in the rule of law deficiency in
Nigeria’s privatization.
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49 For years, the Nigerian Labour Congress and its affiliate organizations of the
working-class people have consistently challenged the privatization exercise in
Nigeria. Part of their grouse is that the transfer of public wealth to private firms
is unconstitutional. See Ayo Ayodeji, “Oppose The Privatization and Liquidation
of PHCN” <http://www.workersalternative.com/national-issues/123-aa>
accessed 7 November 2018.
50 David M. Newberry, Privatization, Restructuring, and Regulation of Network Utilities
(Cambridge, Mass. 1999). See chapter 6 of Jose’ A. Gomes-Ibanez, Regulating
Infrastructure: Monopoly, Contracts, and Discretion (Harvard 2003) for a
comparative analysis of the rise of public utilities in the US, Canada and Latin
America.
4.  WHICH FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND VALUES
SHOULD GUIDE PRIVATIZATION PROCESS?
Does the Constitution support the divestment of government shares
in public enterprises to private firms? Does section 16 of the
Constitution mandate that the main sector of the Nigerian economy
should be under public ownership and control? Or does it authorize
private ownership and control of these main sectors of the economy?
As clear as this constitutional provision may seem, it doesn’t provide a
clear and unambiguous answer to these questions. This constitutional
provision lends itself to conflicting interpretations. Critics of
privatization can and have relied on this same section 16 of the
Constitution to argue against the privatization of public enterprises.49
The idea that the “commanding heights of the economy” should remain
under the control of the public sector is popular with some radical
economists and their civil society supporters. The history of public
ownership and management of utility services in Nigeria takes a different
path from those of Britain or the United States. In both countries,
utility services started as private enterprises before the economies of
scale and failure of regulation encouraged municipal takeover as public
monopolies.50 On the other hand, because Nigeria became independent
during a period marked by the triumphant move of socialism and
nationalization in newly decolonizing countries, Nigeria began with
the government controlling an overwhelming percentage of economic
activities. Although the country is a mixed economy, the government
still controls important sectors like power, oil and gas, telecommunica-
tions and transportation. Often it manages these economic activities
through a public corporation or joint ventures where it exercises
ownership rights. This history and context support the interpretation
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51 Section 1 of the National Electric Power Authority Act, Chapter 256, Laws of
the Federation of Nigeria,2000. This law has been repealed by the Electric
Power Sector Reform Act, 2005.
52 This will surely be a controversial view. Many will believe that the proper focus
should be on economic costs and benefits, not on social costs and benefits such
that where the privatized company performs more efficiently as a result of
privatization, social costs should be disregarded.
of section 16 of the Constitution which mandates public ownership of
the “commanding heights of the economy”.
But the same provisions can be read to mean that the Nigerian
Constitution permits, and even requires, private ownership of major
economic activities. This reading of the Constitution argues that any
citizen or group of citizens (including corporate citizens) can operate
any business in Nigeria, including those economic activities that may
be deemed to fall under the “commanding heights” of the economy
unless such a sector has been restricted by a resolution of each House
of the National Assembly to be operated exclusively by the Government
of the Federation. Therefore, it suffices to say that any government-
owned business can be operated by every Nigerian so long as it has
not been declared a “major sector of the economy”. A few businesses
have been classified under “major sector of the economy” through laws
that established public monopolies to manage them. An example was
the National Electric Power Authority (NEPA) which had exclusive
power to generate and market electricity in Nigeria before the present
wave of privatization.51
In privatizing public enterprises, therefore, government has often
failed to pay attention to the implications of constitutional provisions.
Despite the preferred reading of section 16 of the Constitution and the
preferred side on the debate over public/private ownership of the
commanding heights of the economy, it is clear that in translating from
public to private ownership, the state should protect and promote
some constitutional values. For example, it must ensure that
privatization results in efficient utilization of resources. In this sense,
enterprises should not function less efficiently after privatization. And
they should not create social costs that outweigh their economic gains.52
The Constitution also requires enterprises to be run in a manner
that guarantees a self-reliant economy. It is difficult to say what is a
self-reliant economy in an age where openness and global integration
have been accepted to be the norm. Does it mean an economy where
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53 There is a debate whether a country that has signed up to the “Washington
Consensus”, including privatization and liberalization, has a choice on the
direction of its economy. Thomas Friedman has argued that once a country puts
on the “straightjacket” it loses the autonomy to determine its economic fate
(Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization (Picador
2012). Joe Studwell, How Asia Works: Success and Failure in the World’s Most
Dynamic Region (Grove Press 2013) argues that East Asia prospered by deviating
from the official script of the Washington Consensus.
54 Most judicial interpretations of constitutional provisions have not been
consciously based on legislative history, especially proceedings of constitutional
conference. Nigerian judges have been more inclined to adopting a strict
constructionist approach that relies on the clear meaning of the text. Nigerian
judges have been more textualists and when they have been more activist in
their interpretation it has not been based on deliberate resort to deliberative
materials in the parliament. In Nafisu Rabiu v. The State (1980) 2 NCLR 293,
Udo Udoma, JSC, offered a classical expression of the broad approach to
constitutional interpretation in Nigeria, to wit, that the broad meaning should
the major enterprises are owned by citizens as was the case in Nigeria
before economic liberalization? Or is it an economy that is cleverly
insulated against the manipulation of external economic actors and
the exogenous crisis of international capitalism? In the present context
of global trade openness and intense networking of world economies,
a constitutional requirement of economic self-reliance stipulates, at
least in the minimum, an economy that is not so import-dependent
and externally-oriented that it compromises the welfare of the citizens
by making goods and services relatively dearer for them. An economy
will not be self-reliant if local factors of production, including human
capital, are not developed and made competitive, thus forcing them to
rely on technical expertise and financial capital from overseas to run
the economy.53 Whether the goal of self-reliance is a priority for an
economy like Nigeria’s is questionable. The premise for it, however, is
the need to guarantee sustainable economic welfare for the citizens,
especially in the era of western imperialism and Cold War rivalry which
treated developing countries as pawns.
The Constitution also imposes the objective of fairness and equity
on the management of the national economy. The government is
required to manage the economy in a manner that “secures the
maximum welfare, freedom and happiness of every citizen on the basis
of social justice and equality of status and opportunity”. Nigerian
constitutional jurisprudence does not shed much light on the exact
intent of the framers of the Constitution.54 Does the Constitution intend
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be preferred to the narrow in constitutional interpretation except there is
something in the instant case to make the narrow meaning preferable.
55 See Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue; The Theory and Practice of Equality
(Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 2002) for a discussion of different
conceptions of equality.
56 The Bureau for Public Enterprises (BPE), the transactions manager, has always
justified privatization exercises on the basis of their legality and due process
and not on the basis of following imperatives in section 16 of the Constitution.
57 Section 6(6)(c) of CFRN 1999.
58 A.G. Ondo v. A.G. Federation & 35 Ors. (2002) NWLR (Pt. 722) 222
59 Section 13 CFRN 1999 states, “It shall be the duty and responsibility of all
organs of government and of all authorities and persons, executive, legislative
or judicial powers to conform to, observe and apply the provisions of this Chapter
of this Constitution”.
a welfarist, capitalist, or socialist economy? What notion of “social
justice” and “equality” did they have in mind? Is it equality of resources
or equality of opportunity?55
These questions will require extensive clarification and study.
However, what is remarkable is the failure of the privatization agency
to conceptualize and justify the rationale and expected benefits of
privatization according to the schema of interests and values that the
Constitution has mandated.56 This failure may relate to a perverse
legalism that capitalizes on the statement in the Constitution that the
judicial power of the court to determine questions of violation or
deprivation of rights and interests shall not extend to the “question as
to whether any act or omission by any authority or person or as to
whether any law or any judicial decision is in conformity with the
Fundamental Objective and Directive Principles of State Policy”.57 This
provision in the country has been adjudged by the Supreme Court as
precluding judicial enforcement of provisions of the Directive Principle
except they have been further legislated into law.58 The disavowal of
judicial enforcement has induced a thinking that there is no legislative
and executive obligation to implement these directives in spite of the
clear prescription in section 13 that all authorities and persons must
apply the directive principle.59 This is a wrong reading of Chapter 2 of
the Constitution and the decisions of the court of its judicial
enforcement. These cases have not tried to reconcile the clear and
mandatory language of section 13 and the exclusory language of section
6(6)(c). Although the Nigerian Supreme Court has always urged for
expansive interpretation in the interpretation of the constitutional text,
22 AFE BABALOLA UNIVERSITY:  J. OF SUST. DEV. LAW & POLICY VOL. 10: 1: 2019
it has ill-advisedly limited the enforceability of the Directive Principles
of State Policy.
One explanation for the hesitation to accord the rights in Chapter
2 equal status with Chapter 4 rights might be that the protection of
Chapter 2 rights requires heavy public budget and policy implementa-
tion whereas Chapter 4 rights are self-executory. This is the so-called
dichotomy between “negative” and “positive” rights. But, like Stephen
Holmes and Cass Sunstein argue, this distinction is arbitrary. “Rights
are costly because remedies are expensive. Enforcement is expensive,
especially fair and uniform enforcement, and legal rights remain hollow
to the extent that they remain unenforced. Formulated differently, almost
every right implies a correlative duty, and duties are taken seriously
only when dereliction is punished by the public purse drawing on the
public purse”.60
Some human rights groups oppose privatization on the ground
that transferring public ownership of important economic activities to
private firms violates the fundamental objectives and directive principles
of state policy, even if the court will not grant remedial orders.61
Evidently, the jurisprudential basis of the contention that privatization
of public enterprises in Nigeria is unconstitutional is weak, if we
consider the stance of Nigerian judges on the enforceability of Chapter
2 rights.62 Textualism has been the dominant interpretive mode of
Nigerian judges. This restricts the meaning and effect which the courts
can give to the fundamental objectives.63 But, a more functional
60 Stephen Holmes and Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost of Rights: Why Liberty Depends
on Taxes (New York 1999), p. 43.
61 Chom Bagu argues that privatization does not maximize the welfare of the
people, rather it exposes Nigeria to the unseen market forces. Therefore, it is
unconstitutional because the Constitution seeks to protect Nigerians from the
repercussions of the volatility of the market. See Chom Bagu, “Efficient Allocation
of Resource Or Looting the Patrimony: A Critical Review of Privatization in
Nigeria” in Eze Onyekpere (ed.), Readings on Privatization (2003) SERI,
pp. 47-8.
52 The Nigerian courts reacted quickly to the inclusion of social and economic
rights in the Constitution and held that those rights under the Fundamental
Objective and Directive Principles of State Policy are not enforceable. See
Archbishop Okogie v. Attorney General of Lagos State (1981) 2 NCLR 337.
63 A good example of textualism leading to obnoxious outcome is the interpretation
the Supreme Court gave to the power of the Attorney General to discontinue
criminal proceedings in section 211 od CFRN 1999 in State v. Ilori (1983) 2 S.C.
155 Whereby the court clothed him with unreviewable discretion in matter of
criminal prosecution.
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interpretive stance will consider that the Constitution mandates public
officials to bear in mind these directive principles in managing national
affairs. If public officials ought to reflect these fundamental objectives
in the policies they design and how they manage these policies, why
would a court not have the jurisdiction to, at least, review the effects
public officials give to the objectives. Many human rights groups have
initiated legal suits to challenge privatization for violating or depriving
the state of resources to fulfil these fundamental principles. Most of
these suits were non-suited by judges who refuse to exercise jurisdiction
on the grouse that these objectives are not enforceable.64
The Nigerian Constitution rightly contains chapter 2 rights because
of their importance to both advancing individual welfare and ensuring
sustainable economic and social development. The court’s restrictive
and formalistic interpretation of sections 6 and 13 of the Constitution
frustrates the objective of the Constitution which is to “promote the
good government and welfare of all persons in our country, on the
principles of freedom, equality and justice”.65 By placing a “duty” upon
every public official to comply with the provisions of chapter 2 the
framers of the Constitution understand that unless certain immediate
economic and social goals are made immediately attainable, non-violent
social change may be impossible. Thus, by making those social and
economic goals immediately attainable, chapter 2 makes “welfare state
attainable”.66 Employing a Hohfeldian analysis,67 Justice Oputa argues
that section 13 makes Chapter 2 rights enforceable because “duty is
the correlate of right and is to be applied to those acts which a person
is bound to do by virtue of the office he holds”.68 Criticizing Nigeria’s
jurisprudence on the enforceability of social and economic rights, Oputa
urged the courts to adopt the prudential jurisprudence of the India
64 N.U.E.E. v. BPE (2010) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1194), p. 583.
65 Preamble to the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999.
66 C.A. Oputa, Themes on Judicial Activism and the Law (Abuja 2014), p. 100.
67 American legal theorist, Wesley Hohfeld attempted to clarify the language of
“rights” by aligning legal pedagogy to legal philosophy. He posited four usages
of “right” in the form of jural correlates and jural opposites. His important
contribution is the insight that the use of “right” as claim imports “duty” as a
correlate. See Wesley Hohfeld, “Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied
in Judicial Reasoning”, 23 Yale Law Journal 16 (1913) and “Fundamental Legal
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning”, p. 26 Yale Law Journal 710
(1917).
68 Ibid, page 99.
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Supreme Court which considered judicial enforcement of Directive
Principles of State Policy in the Indian Constitution critical to the
achievement of the constitutional prescription of a welfare state.69
But, in spite of the jurisprudence of their judicial enforceability,
these objectives are important as tools of public policy analysis and
management. The court agrees that not being justiciable does not mean
these directives are not important and could not be realized through
policy or programme.70 Privatization, being a programme to improve
the economic and social well-being of the citizens and residents in
Nigeria, should be benchmarked on how it helps to realize the
fundamental objectives of efficient utilization of natural resources and
promote a self-reliant economy, equity, and social justice across ethnic,
gender and class groups. The fact that a privatization process flouts
fundamental constitutional objectives (whether they are strictly
enforceable or not) goes to demonstrate its incoherence and
illegitimacy; and further makes it unpopular and unsustainable. Above
all, such failure to comply with these constitutional directives
(justiciable or not) shows that privatization, as an exercise, rather
than as a policy choice, flouts the test of compliance with the rule of
law. As indicated hereunder, failure to conform to the rule of law
imperatives in the Constitution makes the privatization process fraught
with legal, political and technical errors which compromise the post-
privatization performance of the enterprises and the political
sustainability of privatization itself.
5.  RULE OF LAW FAILURE AND THE
FAILURE OF PRIVATIZATIONS
The rule of law critique in this article has taken two dimensions. First,
the formalist conception of rule of law would consider whether the
programme itself has followed the provisions of the law, particularly
the transaction laws. This is often the perspective that the promoters
and supporters of privatization resort to when they justify the legality,
even the constitutionality of privatization programmes. But, as the
69 Ibid, page 95. See Peoples Union for Democratic Rights v. Minister of Home Affairs
(1996) L.R.C (Const), p. 548 where the court suspended procedure constraints
and adopted “epistolary procedure” to allow prisoners to litigate on their human
rights through letters addressed to the court.
70 Federal Republic of Nigeria v. Anache (2004) 14 WRN 1.
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analysis has shown, this claim is undercut by the several failures of the
managers to comply with the formalities of legality. The second critique
is the substantive justice critique, which, in the context of the papers,
focuses on the fundamental objectives and directive principles of state
policy in chapter 2 of the Constitution. More specifically, section 16
thereof. The rest of the article will adumbrate on the substantive justice
critique in highlighting some of the failures of privatization in Nigeria.
The fact that the privatization process has passed through many
phases since its introduction in the late 1980s may give the impression
of evident success. Although there have been some successes in the
process and improvement in the post-privatization performance of some
of the erstwhile public enterprises, the Nigerian model cannot be
described as a successful model of privatization. The privatization
agency and government spokespersons have boasted of tremendous
success with the process.71 These exaggerated claims are often based
on revenues derived from privatization and token stimulation in the
volume of trade or business activities in specific sectors. Much of the
assessment has been based on the price of the assets in mind and
success has been largely determined by the conclusion of transfer rather
than performance improvement in the privatized entity after
privatization.72
The most successful privatization pointed out by its managers is
the liberalization of the telecom sector that improves drastically Nigeria’s
mobile telephone usage. Although the process involved more of
liberalization than privatization, it must be conceded that the
involvement of private firms in telecom operations has greatly enhanced
telecommunication in Nigeria. Nevertheless, there is such a huge failure
in the quality of telecom services provided in Nigeria that questions
the claim of success. For example, Nigeria has one of the most expensive
71 Andrew Ojiezel, “BPE Justifies Privatization of PHCN”, Vanguard, 28 September
2015 <http://allcitynews.com.ng/bpe-justifies-privatization-of-phcn/>
accessed 14 November 2017.
72 This is the trade-off between revenue and efficiency as the motivation for
privatization. Where the motivation is to reduce public sector borrowing
requirement or to raise revenue for other strategic purposes the state may not
care enough about efficiency gains post privatization but care more about revenue
grossed from divestment. In that case “auction” may be the best privatization
methodology. See Bernardo Bortolotti and Domenico Siniscalco, The Challenges
of Privatization: An International Analysis (supra), pp. 16-17.
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calls and the highest frequency of drop-calls in the world.73 And these
post-liberalization problems in the telecom sector derive from lack of
commitment to equity and social justice issues in privatization. All
these are secured by paying serious attention to the “regulatory
imperative” in section 16 of the Constitution.
The latest efforts at privatization have been in the electricity sector.
Here the success story is that by November 2013 the Nigerian
government successfully sold 17 companies from the former Power
Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN) to private firms that paid over
N400 billion.74 These companies include six generating companies and
eleven distribution companies. As part of privatization, the government
handed management of the Transmission Company of Nigeria (TCN)
to a private firm – Manitoba of Canada. Since the privatization of
electricity companies, however, services have not improved. The major
reasons articulated for privatizing public enterprises in the electricity
sector were to improve efficiency measured in terms of availability,
reliability and affordability of electricity services and to reduce public
sector borrowing requirement for the power sector.75 Privatization is
expected to increase generation capacity and boost the supply of
electricity to Nigerian homes and businesses in the short to medium
terms. But the evidence after over a decade of implementation of the
reform agenda does not justify the huge sum spent on the reform
process. The privatized generation companies have not significantly
expanded their capacity since privatization.76 Moreover, instead of
refusing to spend on any of the sector, as advertised by privatization,
government continues to invest billions into the ailing industry.77
73 Nigerian Communication Commission, Nigerian Consumer Satisfaction Survey
Final Report (Final Report Part 2: Data Analysis, November 2012), pp. 39-40.
74 Clara Nwachukwu, “Nigeria realized N400bn from electricity privatization”,
Vanguard 3 September 2013< https://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/09/
nigeria-realised-n400bn-from-electricity-privatisation/> accessed 14
November 2017.
75 National Council on Privatization, the National Electric Power Policy (NEPP)
2000.
76 In 2017, the average daily generation of electricity was 3,687mw as reported
by the system operator< https://www.vanguardngr.com/2017/04/electricity-
generation-averages-3687mw-q117-nbs/> accessed 15 November 2017.
77 The latest financial support from the federal government to the privatized
electricity firms is N701bn intervention fund< https://www.thisdaylive.com/
index.php/2017/05/28/n701bn-stimulus-fg-moves-to-buoy-electricity-
generation/> accessed on 15 November 2017.
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Similarly, the quality of service has not improved as customers
continue to suffer overbilling because of lack of metering. The level of
aggregate technical, commercial and collection (ATC&C) losses remain
as high as it was before privatization.78 This data is significant because
the distribution companies were sold on the grounds that the private
investors would immediately improve the network through strategic
financial and technical investment and change management strategies.
The verdict of the Nigerian political authority is that privatization
of the electricity sector has failed to achieve its advertised goals or at
least has not improved quality of service significantly.79 This verdict is
not unexpected, given that privatization is rarely successful without a
much more sustained social and economic reform. The Nigerian example
has been a matter of hurried privatization and shock therapy based on
the presumption that the transfer of ownership from public to private
sector would automatically result in more efficient and competitive
electricity market. This sort of market fundamentalism is rife in
developing countries. It leads to the oversight of critical institutional
reforms that should accompany privatization.
This is a failure of the rule of law in the design and execution of
privatization. Chapter 2 of the Constitution presents some imperatives
that would have led to better outcomes. The first imperative is the
economic growth imperative. Section 16 mandates the government to
manage the economy in a manner that ensures growth. How does
privatization contribute to economic growth? One of the arguments in
support of this is that it will ensure the efficient allocation of resources,
which will boost productivity. In the specific case of the Nigerian
economy, the absence of reliable electricity has stunted economic
growth. And it is known generally that infrastructure deficit costs huge
financial losses to the economy.
But economic growth is not enough to justify privatization and the
methodology used. Does the growth translate to social justice? How
does the growth in the economy benefit the worst-off? This is the
second imperative of the rule of law critique, namely, the social justice
imperative. Growth exponents argue as if economic growth automatically
78 Simon Echewofon Sunday, “DisCos loss 40% of revenue, power in 2016-
NERC”< https://dailytrust.com.ng/discos-lost-40-of-revenue-power-in-2016-
nerc.html> accessed on 15 November 2017.
79 Senator Bukola Saraki, “Power Privatization has Failed”, Punch, 10 January
2017.
28 AFE BABALOLA UNIVERSITY:  J. OF SUST. DEV. LAW & POLICY VOL. 10: 1: 2019
benefits the poor. As Ke-young Che puts it, “Countries reduce poverty
by achieving economic growth. This is how the Western world and,
more recently, Japan and newly industrialized countries have reduced
poverty”.80 From this premise, a commitment to economic growth is
derivatively a commitment to poverty reduction, which is one way of
achieving social justice. But, growth does not necessarily lead to poverty
reduction, and the Nigerian example has proved that. The sort of growth
that could lead to improved welfare for the poor would be of a particular
character. Ke-young Che rightly concedes that the growth that would
lead to poverty reduction must be such that is complemented by
economic and political institutions that allow the poor to access much
of the fruit of economic growth. These institutions, as defined by
Douglas North, are humanely devised rules and processes that constrain
or enable actions of economic and social actors.81
To satisfy the social justice imperative, a privatization programme
must be executed in a manner that builds institutions of equity and
access to resources. Such institutions will comprise the regulatory
landscape of post-privatization. It will also be determined by the
methodology adopted for divestment of public shares in the state-
owned enterprises (SOEs). One such important institution of equity
would be the social safety net. It is important to note that as inefficient
as the public enterprises may be, they perform the important function
of acting as a social safety net and platform for income redistribution,
which are components of a social justice system.82 Privatization denies
the economic system of this viable instrument of redistribution, thereby
compromising efforts at reducing inequality and promoting social
welfare.
This latter point goes to the issue of mode of privatization. The
preferred mode should be dictated by the preferred outcome. In the
context of the fundamental directive of state principle, the preferred
outcome should be one that guarantees social security for the poor
80 Ke-young Che, “Collective values, behavioural norms and rules: Building
institutions for economic growth and poverty reduction” in Ralph van der
Hoeven and Anthony Shorricks (eds.), Perspectives on Growth and Poverty
(United Nations University Press 2003), p. 1.
81 Douglas North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance
(Cambridge University Press, 1990).
82 See the second principle of justice as fairness as articulated by John Rawls in
his A Theory of Justice, Ibid.
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people. It should be one that disperses, rather than concentrates
wealth. The BPE has often preferred to divest fully to a few investors.
But, as Bortolotti and Siniscalco counsel, such a move may guarantee
that more money is realized from the sale, but it would also mean that
“government loses a powerful instrument for targeted distribution…
the right of having representatives on the board in order to affect
corporate decisions, and the power to safeguard public interest and
national security”.83
The third imperative, the regulatory imperative, flows from the social
justice imperative. The Constitution requires that the economy be
regulated in a manner that can guarantee equality and social welfare
for all citizens. This means that if the government will hand over public
enterprises that play social security and redistribution functions it must
ensure that it establishes a strong regulatory regime. In the initial stages
of privatization, the government proceeded without the benefits of
regulatory regimes, including competition law. The immediate result
of this was the failure to improve quality of service even after
privatization. In the case of electricity, the privatization happened after
the regulatory agency – Nigerian Electricity Regulatory Commission –
had been established.84 Although the regulatory agency had been in
existence for about 8 years before the electricity assets were privatized,
yet the regulatory regime has not become robust. During the 8 years of
its existence of the commission, the Commissioners were sacked from
office and absent for about 3-4 years. The new Commissioners
appointed in 2010 have barely settled in office when privatization of
the electricity sector commenced in earnest.
It was in this milieu of inadequate regulatory experience and
capacity that privatization was completed in 2013 without the
completion of some of the critical components of a solid regulatory
regime. One of such important components is the Power Consumer
Assistance Fund (PCAF), which the Electric Power Sector Reform (EPSR)
Act requires as a transitional safeguard for poor electricity consumers
83 Bernardo Bortolotti and Domenico Siniscalco supra page 84. It ought to be
noted that while privatizing electricity distribution companies, the BPE inserted
the right to have a nominal representation on the board.
84 The Nigerian Electricity Regulatory Commission (NERC) was established by
sections 31 and 32 of the Electric Power Sector Reform Act 2005 as a commission
vested with technical, commercial and social regulation over the electricity
supply industry in Nigeria.
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during the initial period of high tariff after privatization.85 PCAF is a
form of cross-subsidy for poor consumers in order to ensure that during
the inevitable initial period of higher tariff there will be no exclusion
of access for some citizens. Universal access is a core obligation of the
electricity industry as well as a mandate of the Constitution.
Social justice will be violated if citizens are prevented from
accessing an essential social service like electricity on account of their
inability to pay a high bill. This is compounded in the Nigerian case by
the absence of metering. The metering level before privatization was
about 40 per cent, and it has remained largely so since privatization.
Ordinarily, the metering of customers should have been perfected to
guarantee efficient electricity supply long before the introduction of
privatization. After failing to provide meters for many customers, or
because of it, the operators then proceeded to slam estimated bills on
them as a way of recouping collection losses from non-paying
customers. This compounds the financial non-viability of the entire
electricity value-chains and also weakens the willingness to pay.
These problems and many more reinforce the need for the fourth
imperatives of the rule of law: the planning imperative. The Constitution
mandates the government to plan the economy in such a manner that
will engender prosperity and social justice for all. The imperative of a
planned economy requires the government not to abandon a strategic
sector like the electricity industry to the uncertainties of a free market.
Government ought to design a strategic plan for the working of every
aspect of the economy and take responsibility for outcomes instead of
placing its hope on the benevolence of the free market.
6.  CONCLUSION
Generally, Nigeria took the right step in embracing privatization as the
preferred economic model to grow its economy and ensure efficient
supply of essential services. Although the resort to privatization and
other forms of liberalization may have been procured at the instance
of the international multilateral financial institutions like the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and its ideology of
market fundamentalism, it is still comparatively a wise policy choice
to deal with the pervasive inefficiency and corruption of public
85 Section 83 of the Electric Power Sector Reform (EPSR) Act 2005.
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enterprises. But this argument does not extend to accepting the manner
in which an acceptable or tolerable policy was executed. While the
adoption of privatization as an economic reform policy is compatible
with the obligation to enforce and promote the Fundamental Objectives
and Directive Principles of State Policy in section 13 of the Constitution,
the manner of implementation may not be so compatible. This is what
this article has demonstrated.
 Section 16 of chapter 2 of the Constitution provides a framework
to ensure that privatization achieves the strategic goal of improving
efficiency and achieving economic growth. But the the framework also
seeks to ensure compliance with the rule of law. Both supporters and
critics of privatization fail to highlight this convergence. Rule of law
compliance is not just a legalistic concept; it is a commitment that will
enable privatization to achieve its strategic goals. The rule of law
compliance that will lead to achieving the strategic goals of privatization
must go beyond the formal conception of rule of law as compliance
with formal criteria of law, namely, generality, certainty, and clarity. It
must br built on a substantive justice conception of the rule of law,
which requires compliance with a programme that promotes economic
and social justice.
